If modern Britain faces a challenge today, it is to recover the language and the spirit of the age of democracy, to forge a meeting place for all citizens where firmly-held beliefs are not disqualified because they are seen as â??outmodedâ?? or â??dogmaticâ??. The public sphere is the forum of collective reasoning, and it cannot be a space empty of tradition and particular belief. A tolerant society is not one without constitutive beliefs, since its tolerance flows from a very constitutive belief.
Pope Benedict rightly emphasises the use of reason. Reason informs discussion and reasonable decisions. The public sphere is the locus of a discussion in which society seeks a common mind about important matters. The importance of religion to that discussion is vital, because religion is, fundamentally, concerned with truth. Truth is not something we construct, but something we seek together. The right to religious freedom and to respect for the exercise of conscience on its journey towards the truth has been increasingly recognised as the foundation of the cumulative rights of the person. There can only be a democratic discussion when truth is a matter of universal concern. That is why freedom of religion cannot be a relative value. Freedom of religion is not unconditional, of course; but it cannot be made relative to other rights on the grounds that truth is not the concern of the state. A state which denies the freedom of religion is not a religiously neutral state, but a state which upholds relativism. Relativism takes its stand on a desire for equal treatment of different beliefs in the conviction that these beliefs are relative. Yet, in contradictory fashion, it does so because of a belief in human equality and dignity, which are not relative values. Relativism is no friend of true democracy. By banishing religion from the public sphere in the name of equality, it discounts religious perspectives from debate, banishes truth to a private sphere, labels it â??religiousâ?? and infers it to be irrational, and solidifies disagreements into divergent strands of belief. Debate is thereby impoverished, and democracy weakened.
The assertion of truth is not an obstacle to freedom but its precondition. If we allow religious perspectives in debate, we can discuss issues about truth on the basis of reason. We can search for the truth together, using reason in freedom.
Cardinal Cormac Murphy-Oâ??Connor RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC FORUM â?? the Corbishley Lecture, 28 March 2007, Westminster Cathedral Hall. (The full lecture is a Word document at the bottom of the page).
